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It is evident that we are at a primitive stage of moral development. Even the most civilised 
human beings have only a haphazard understanding of how to live, how to treat others, how 
to organise their societies. The idea that the basic principles of morality are known , and that 
the problems all come in their interpretation and application, is one of the most fantastic 
conceits to which our conceited species has been drawn. (The idea that if we cannot easily 
know it, there is no truth here is no less conceited.) Not all of our ignorance in these areas is 
ethical, but a lot of it is. And the idea of the possibility of moral progress is an essential 
condition of moral progress. None of it is inevitable.1  
 
Thomas Nagel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stan Godlovitch is a Senior Lecturer in philosophy in the Department of Human and Leisure 
Sciences at Lincoln University. 
                                                 
1 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford UP), p. 186 
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A Joke from Jake and Elwood 
 
In one of the many matchless scenes in John Landis's 1980 classic The Blues Brothers, Jake 
and Elwood invade a swank Chicago restaurant, seat themselves at a table next to a very 
proper, very patrician family, and proceed to conduct themselves in an exuberantly obnoxious 
manner.  Such behaviour predictably upsets the family members who try without success to 
ignore their unmannerly neighbours.  Taking full advantage of his assault advantage, Jake 
leans over and greasily addresses the family patriarch in a gruff all-purpose foreign accent.  
Gesturing grandly at the man's wife and daughters, Jake puts it to him man-to-man:"Your 
women.  I want your women.  How much for your women?" 
 
The humour in the scene flows not only from the comic genius of John Belushi and his take on 
the well-worn incongruities of the boorish slob amongst the genteel, but from one of those tacit 
absurdities which the scene brings into centre stage.  You just don't horse-trade in women.  In 
fact, you just don't buy and sell humans, period.  They are just not that sort of thing - and not 
just among civilised folk. 
 
Had Jake been out to horse-trade in horses, the absurdity which infects the original scene 
would have been lost.  More interestingly, however, had the movie screened at a time - not so 
long ago - when just that sort of horse-trading in humans was just another piece of business as 
usual, another brisk market exchange, so too the intended absurdity would simply have 
flopped.  At least, the commercial aspect of the scene would not have contributed to its 
humour. 
 
At the risk of sounding ponderous, the scene from the Blues Brothers works now as black 
humour because the typical contemporary Western audience can reliably be counted upon as 
subscribing to an unquestioned, categorical, absolute, strictly moral conviction.  Human beings 
are not marketable commodities.  It goes even further.  We don't allow others, even if they 
volunteer, to sell themselves into slavery.  I cannot buy another human as my property, nor can 
you voluntarily and without coercion sell your person to me as an item of fair exchange.  We 
can sell our services, to be sure, our time, our blood, our labour, our skills, but we cannot sell 
ourselves.  I cannot own you, and you cannot own me, period.  It  wasn't always this way, as 
becomes disorientingly clear when one encounters and even admires a rather handsome 18th 
century stone building near the heart of Charleston, South Carolina - the former slave auction 
centre. 
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What accounts for this change?  One serious explanation as to why we don’t now trade in 
fellow humans must rest in part, if not exclusively, on appeal  to the strength of moral 
principles.  Taken together, these conditions - the former commonplace of the slave trade and 
the present commonplace of Jake and Elwood’s joke - signal a phenomenon we might as well 
call moral progress.  We seem to have moved on morally, and for the better.  That we will 
continue thus is at least a reasonable desire. 
 
1. Some Themes and Undercurrents 
 
A number of themes are addressed below concerning the environment, nature, and implications 
of moral progress.  Central to the account is the very credibility of moral progress itself, for we 
cannot suppose moral progress to have taken place without understanding what exactly it is.  
To get clear about this notion, some groundclearing is necessary.  This concerns various 
general concepts of progress, some relevant and some not, which need sorting out.  We must 
also consider, however briefly, other domains in which progress of the relevant sort seems to 
have taken place as well as domains where the notion of progress is more controversial.  So, 
for example, whereas it seems reasonably unproblematic to argue that progress has occurred in 
natural science and technology, it is far less certain that progress has taken place in art or 
religion.  If talk about moral progress makes any sense, it seems to fall  amongst such practices 
as law and government.  The question arises: if there is moral (or legal or political) progress at 
all, are we right in characterising it in terms of the progress typical of the sciences? If not, may 
there be another way of characterising it which preserves its progressive quality?  
 
Once we have to hand a working notion of moral progress, we must then turn to its 
implications for conduct.  Morality is the name we give to a special body of rules,  principles 
and notions which we identify as governing certain aspects of our conduct towards others.  
Those rules, principles and notions affect us both negatively and positively.  They constrain 
our conduct toward others in various ways and thus define the limits of permissible action.  
They also oblige us to act benevolently on behalf of others.  All this is done in the context of 
the moral regard or respect owed to others.  Typical principles deal with, say, causing harm to 
others, or relate to practices such as promising, charitableness, fairness and truth-telling.  
Relatedly, we recognize morally relevant aspects of character - virtues and vices - such as 
honesty, generosity, duplicity, intolerance and so on, which, as exemplars, identify both worthy 
and destructive personality types. 
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1.1 Moral Domains and Moral Authority 
 
To understand fully the implications of any given morality, we must be aware not only of the 
rules, principles and notions appealed to, but, equally, of the domain to which those rules and 
principles properly apply.  Who counts morally? Who are the proper beneficiaries of morally 
sanctioned and required conduct? If, as seems prima facie plausible, moral progress consists in 
the tendency towards a strengthening acknowledgment of the autonomy and moral status of an 
ever-expanding group; i.e. a growing moral inclusiveness, then what is permissible becomes 
proportionately more limited and what is obligatory increasingly more varied and demanding.  
The greater the limits on permissibility and the greater the broadening of obligation, the greater 
the likelihood of conflict with other dimensions of conduct, most pointedly those concerning 
our tendency to serve ourselves both individually and collectively in the name of rational 
prudence or self-interest.  The greater the risk of conflict, the greater the need to establish the 
relative authority and stringency of the moral domain.  To what extent do we allow our moral 
considerations to limit if not outrightly trump our non-moral interests? To what degree are we 
bound by the dictates of our morality? The question of authority has obviously both personal 
and collective dimensions.  To the extent that we collectively abide by and even internalise a 
given moral injunction - e.g. “Thou shalt not buy and sell human beings” - such that we intend 
it to apply categorically, thereby have we vested in such an injunction as close to an absolute 
moral authority as we might recognize. 
 
Given this sort of authority, one may enrich our first passing sketch of moral progress thus: if 
there is any moral progress at all, one makes moral progress to the extent that one vests 
increasingly greater moral authority in the rules and principles which are respectful of 
increasing moral inclusiveness.  Note, this enrichment now incorporates two separable 
dimensions of moral progress; viz., the growth of the moral domain and the growth of moral 
authority.  Growth in either might constitute a species of moral progress all on its own, though 
it seems fair to say that domain growth without authority growth is limp, while authority 
growth without domain growth arbitrarily plays favourites.  The two dimensions share one 
telling feature; they both, in their own ways, magnify moral presence by limiting choice and 
action.  Domain growth makes more choices and actions morally wrong by increasing the 
number of obligations we accept; while authority growth makes existing moral obligations 
more stringent and leaves less room open for excusable, unreflective, self-serving routines and 
preferences.  If progress has indeed been made in the scope of the moral domain and if that  
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growth is likely to continue, we can reasonably predict that what we collectively regard as the 
sphere of uncontestably permissible conduct will shrink.  Given an accompanying progress in 
moral authority, what actions we actually will perform will be characterised increasingly in 
terms of their moral tone.  In familiar terms, moral progress increasingly demands that an ever-
greater proportion of our actions be seen as “matters of principle”; i.e. as matters to be squared 
with the court of right and wrong. 
 
1.2 Freedom and Knowledge 
 
Underlying the account of moral progress are two major historical undercurrents, both of 
which flow from particularly Western aspects of philosophy and natural science, and which 
have increasingly influenced the transformation of our moral and political environments.  One 
force has moved us ever closer to the realisation of both personal liberty and autonomy as well 
as collective sovereignty and self-determination.  The other force, care of the dazzling growth 
in the natural sciences, has moved us ever closer to a more detached and objective 
understanding of our place in the grand historical and physical scheme of things. 
 
On the philosophical side, we are heirs to a long-standing and successful liberationist and 
liberalising intellectual tradition which features among its most influential first voices the 17th 
century theorists John Locke and Thomas Hobbes.  The theme of individual autonomy and 
collective sovereignty, strongly reinforced in the works of Voltaire, Rousseau and Jefferson, 
was  woven into powerful political forces in the 18th century which precipitated the 
revolutions in the United States and France.  Distilling that century’s reflective sanctification 
of human autonomy and self-determination was the work of Kant.  Upon this foundation, the 
liberal individualism of Bentham and Mill could confidently be built, as well as could the 
liberationist utopian themes of the early socialists and Marx.  What began in a privileged 
climate of intellectual inquiry has become entrenched and internalised in the general populace, 
and became no longer a matter of opinion or controversy.  We now live in a moral atmosphere 
in which many, perhaps most, take comfortably and intuitively for granted both the individual 
entitlement to live one's life as each one sees fit, and the collective entitlement to determine 
how we as a society are to be governed.  How to resolve the tensions between these 
entitlements and to give each its proper due constitute two of the main moral and political 
issues of our time.  That the tension exists at all is testimony to the categorical authority we  
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vest in such entitlements.  That it has taken nearly three centuries to flow freely in our veins is 
testimony to the persistence of ideas and to the resistance against them. 
 
On the side of science, we are just beginning to absorb the full implications of the story Darwin 
and Wallace first told in the mid-nineteenth century about our very humble beginnings.  Our 
beginnings have been rendered humbler still by paleontological revelations of the mind-
chilling length of tenure life has had on earth - 3.5 billion years so far as we know - and the 
equally numbing discovery of life’s past and present variety.  For this story to take root as part 
our most fundamental outlook may well take another century or two; for, despite the 
hyperactive fantasies some entertain of our present warp speed pace, our minds process no 
faster than they ever did, and our current ability to internalise and feel at home with the more 
radical conceptions of our great thinkers shows no indication of  having outstripped the 
capacities of our predecessors.  That we quickly get used to new gadgets is no sign of any 
matching capacity to absorb new science and philosophy. 
 
As to internalising Darwin's tale, we only just yesterday began to get an inkling as to how life 
itself works.  To internalise the tale requires not only that we acknowledge the common 
ancestry of all life on earth - something we pretty well do already - but also to imbibe it full 
strength, to identify our everyday actions in the world as flowing in part from it.  If 
conceptions of a core human nature gave rise to a sense of our common human identity and 
thereby our common human worth, so conceptions of a core living nature should, when fully 
mature, transform our very sense of the worth of living beings.   
 
Primitive signs of our trying to work out a new sense of our place in the Big Picture are not 
hard to find.  Not only are we exploring with increasing confidence the ‘naturalisation’ of 
theories concerning human cognition, society, and history1; we are also beginning to speculate 
about what sorts of  moral, social, and political principles and obligations might flow from 
naturalising our nature, so to speak, some of the first glimpses of which are to be caught in the  
 
1 The naturalising turn has not been without its critics. See for example, Stephen Stich, Deconstructing the Mind 
(Oxford University Press, 1996). My take on naturalising is, however, less finely focussed than Stich's who 
confines it largely to physicalism and the programme of physical reduction. The charge Stich addresses critically 
is this: if a phenomenon cannot be naturalised in that sense, it cannot be an object of serious scientific study, and 
so may be doomed to expulsion from any acceptable ontology. The sense I intend here involves our increasing 
acceptance of the increasingly broad explanatory role (waiting) to be played by the natural sciences regarding 
human nature. As we inexorably incorporate ourselves ever more deeply and inextricably into the Big Picture of 
time and life, we become increasingly less resistant to appeals to the Big Picture when we wish to focus upon our 
own kind. Whatever the fate of hard-core physicalism, any subsequent serious speculations about our nature can 
no longer dismiss or ignore broad evolutionary, genetic, and ecological influences. 
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embryonic animal rights and green movements and the efforts towards shaping an ecologically 
and socially grounded environmental ethic.  I would guess that, whatever the vicissitudes of 
such enterprises in the short term, we have reached a stage where we are no more able to revert 
seriously to pre- or anti-Darwinian conceptions than we are to revert to internalised acceptance 
of the divine right of kings or the inherent superiority of an hereditary aristocracy.  Given that 
there’s no looking back, we are in store for yet further transformations of our moral intuitions 
which will predictably shine new and probing lights upon our practices affecting the rest of the 
living world. 
 
1.3 Reflective Moralism 
 
The themes and undercurrents considered point to changes in outlook which might be most 
effectively explained as moral progress.  I have emphasised the significance of the 
internalisation of this outlook which comes down to our reaching a state of conviction about 
certain things - the special worth of human life, for example, and eventually the special worth 
of life as such - which becomes so unassailable as to lead us unhesitatingly to revise any of our 
other beliefs and practices which may run afoul of them.  But I don’t wish to leave the 
impression that the sole success of moral progress is to make us unreflectively spontaneous in 
our new-found moral convictions.  Certainly, such unreflective moral spontaneity contributes 
mightily to the effectiveness of new moral outlooks by relieving us of all doubt.  There is, 
however, another unmistakable sign of moral progress, what one might call the ascendancy of 
reflective moralism.  This consists in the warranted conviction that one’s moral outlook is 
respectful of and maximally consistent with everything we can reasonably claim to know about 
human beings from the smallest to the biggest pictures we have available.  Further, part of 
what a reflective moralism tells us is that when one becomes a person with personal surplus - 
leisure, wealth, opportunity, the freedom to reflect - as may happen selectively in an 
aristocratic or more broadly in a liberal democratic capitalist culture, one is suitably in a 
position to assume reflectively the demands of an impersonal, self-consistent, impartial 
conception of trans-tribal morality, and then to try to respond in particular to the tensions it 
creates as real possibilities between living for oneself and one's allies on one's surplus and the 
real options of redistributing that surplus impartially in the form of active other-regarding 
conduct.  For this is very much an opportunity - not a luxury at all - that arises for such 
surplus-laden beings, and opens the door for reflection on the real implications of informed 
altruism.  One optimistic, however paradoxical, assessment of the point and value of personal 
and collective liberation from want  
 7  
                                                
and destitution is precisely to allow us to recognize and accept the increasing limitations upon 
our liberties, due in large part to an acknowledgment of an ever-increasing moral constituency, 
of a growing sphere of those who have genuine claims upon each and all of us. 
 
In a nutshell, we progress morally by virtue of becoming ever more the kinds of beings for 
whom the demands of an impersonal morality both reflectively and spontaneously influence 
our personal and collective choices. 
 
2. Varieties of Progress 
 
What, then, is progress?  I offer only a bare sketch of a cluster of notions, but these should 
suffice for present purposes.  Any notion of progress typically involves some change of state, 
progress often being contrasted with stasis.2 Progress is a temporal notion and names a species 
of event.  Concepts of progress differ primarily over the kind of change involved. 
 
2.1 Measuring Progress 
 
If progress names a type of change, any useful notion of progress must be operational; i.e. 
there must be determinable evidence, signs, and measures of progress.  But because of the 
ways in which change may be manifested, there is nothing built generally into the notion which 
gives the edge to any given method of determination of change.  So, to claim that progress 
cannot be spoken of with regard to some area of interest - science, morality, art, economy - 
unless the change involved can be measured quantitatively would be question-begging.  Why? 
Simply because quantitative measurement cannot proceed without the determination of units, 
and it is a contingent matter of methodological and empirical inquiry as to whether each 
domain in which progress may occur is fittingly and non-arbitrarily susceptible to 
characterisation in terms of standard units.  While economic progress as such may 
appropriately be so quantified, it is highly doubtful that scientific progress, say, may be so 
measured.  This is not to deny that we  
 
2 For present purposes, I ignore the question as to whether stasis can be a form of progress. This arises in the 
context of considerations of sustainability which is basically a form of holding things constant, the achievement 
of which may be regarded as progress in its own right. The achievement of sustainability, however, must itself 
involve a change of state. I also ignore cases where progress can be considered a (mere) return to a previous state 
after a period of decline or regress. This too, at any rate, involves a change of state. Whether true conservatism - 
keeping things constant - can be progressive I reserve judgment on notwithstanding the moniker Progressive 
Conservative of one of Canada's major - however much in hiding these days - political parties. 
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should attempt to seek such units where appropriate3, but one must nevertheless be prepared to 
give up the search if the only way to salvage one’s units involves a patent distortion of the way 
a given domain changes.  From this it is reasonable to assume that one must not privilege any 
notion of progress as more rigorous or objective than another just because it is measured 
quantitatively.  That the concept of progress must be operational entails nothing about the 
modes of any measurement operations, nor does it entail that any one mode of measurement 
constitutes an ideal towards which all the others must aspire.  More pointedly, there can be no 
warrant for the claim that non-quantitative measures are, for that reason, in themselves vague, 
loose or imprecise.  This becomes pertinent in considerations of comparative progress we 
make, for example, between technological and political change. 
 
To measure progress is be able to determine that progress has occurred.  Should one also 
expect to be able to measure the degree and the rate of progress; i.e. by how much and how 
fast has progress occurred? Again, notions of degree and rate operate comfortably when one's 
measurements are quantitative.  Still, degrees of change may be reckoned in a qualitatively 
scalar fashion without reference to base units, and all change rates are mapped against time 
which is typically measured in units. 
 
2.2 Neutral Progress 
 
I will give the name Neutral Progress to the sense of progress as mere change.  This operates 
in expressions such as "charting the progress of X" where we identify nothing more than the 
course or progression of change in the form of a sequential narrative.  We talk, for example, 
about the progress of a disease or a storm and mean nothing more by that than its sequential 
stages.  Nor let us forget Hogarth’s A Harlot’s Progress (1732/33).  In this sense, everything 
may be said to progress.  Note that neutral progress refers only to the changing thing itself.  It 
is a property of all changing things that they neutrally progress. 
 
2.3 Teleological Progress 
 
Richer senses of progress involve more than mere change.  The name Teleological Progress  
captures one special quality of change; namely, progress toward some end-state or goal G.   
 
3 See, for example, Larry Laudan’s treatment of scientific progress in terms of counting solutions to puzzles in 
Progress and its Problems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 
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Here we identify movement toward an end, some goal-seeking and goal-directed sequence of 
change.  To capture fully the sense that there is something changing in a certain direction, we 
speak of the progress of X toward G where X is that which undergoes change on the way to 
some end-state G.  Teleological progress refers to some future end-state which lies outside that 
which is changing.  To refine the notion further, one must bear in mind that just as everything 
neutrally progresses, so many things teleologically progress just in case there is a programmed 
or pre-ordained sequence of changes they undergo.  All living things, since they must die, 
progress toward death in this sense.  Should a living thing fail to die, that would constitute a 
hitch in its teleological progress in exactly the same sense that a seed failing to germinate has 
had its progress impeded.  In case that seems somewhat peculiar a view, consider the worry 
that cancer cells can be kept alive indefinitely.  This is not meant to happen with living things.  
To speak operationally of teleological progress we assume that there exist patterned sequences 
of change which end with determinable and appropriate end-states.  Teleological progress in 
this sense provides for reasonable expectation of outcome given that the programmed 
sequences of change are sure to result in the expected end-state, all things being equal.  Such 
progress applies to many natural and artifactual processes. 
 
Is all progress teleological progress? From the above, we call certain progressive changes 
teleological when we know what the end-state of the process is.  The question is: can we call a 
progressive change teleological only if we know what the end-state of the process is? With 
well-documented highly regular sequences such as embryonic development or the smelting of 
iron from iron ore, we know full well where the processes are destined to lead, and can, 
accordingly, talk of very real problems in developmental progress when things are not as we 
reasonably anticipate.  But there are many cases where we can at best only hypothesise that a 
sequence is teleological overall - for example, the development of technology or science - 
perhaps only because it bears interesting and fruitful comparison with known teleological 
sequences, and we can thus hypothesise only very uncertainly as to what the end-state might 
possibly be.  This is not to say that such progressive development is not teleological.  It may 
well be for all we know.  It is however to say that we certainly do not know whether such a 
sequence has a determinate end-state, and to ask what difference that might make.This 
question is linked to Hume's concern about particular cases of causation.  For Hume, we are 
not entitled to say that some particular a caused b unless we have prior experience of As being 
regularly followed by Bs.  By parity, I cannot say that a's progress is normal or impeded unless 
I already  
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know how things of type A generally unfold.  Again, I cannot, on this account, say that a has 
suffered a setback in its progress. 
 
For now, we can draw a distinction between progressive sequences which are strongly 
teleological and weakly teleological.  A progressive sequence is strongly teleological just in 
case we know it to be teleological.  A progressive sequence is weakly teleological if, despite 
our not knowing whether it is teleological, we have some warrant for modelling it on a 
properly teleological sequence, that warrant being in part the explanatory and predictive 
advantage conferred by so modelling the sequence.  In other words, a sequence is weakly 
teleological (merely) by being treated by hypothesis as if it were teleological. 
 
It should be pretty clear that if we wish to talk at all about progress in any large areas of 
change - science, morality, politics, economy, technology, art, civilisation itself - we will at 
best be confined to talk about weak teleological progress.  Why? Because we come up short on 
assurances as to where the progression is supposed to be heading, if anywhere.  That we want 
it to be heading somewhere definite is another story.  Here the end is not so much a matter of 
forecast as it is a matter of desire.  We can thus make certain neutral progressions teleological.  
Such imposed teleological progress is typical of technology.   
 
Equally clear is the fact that the operational mode for determining progress has no effect at all 
whether progress is weakly or strongly teleological.  That the numbers-crazed astrologer takes 
the most careful and verifiable measurements of the movements of the stars and planets, and 
charts equally precisely their interrelations makes no difference to whether the romantic 
destiny in store for you as a result of such astral configurations is real or imaginary. 
 
2.4 Improvement or Ameliorative Progress 
 
Teleological progress conveys the importance of the patterned direction of progressive change.  
Further, it conveys a sense of normal development not merely as a predictable sequence, but, 
especially with many natural processes, as a characteristically law-governed sequence in the 
very nature of things, whatever our actual powers of prediction.  All this considered, 
teleological progress conveys nothing about the beneficial value of that change.  Let us call 
this value-laden sense Improvement or Ameliorative Progress, progress which is gainful 
change,  
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betterment, advancement, and expressed in phrases like "making progress" or "a change for the 
better." 
 
Whereas Neutral and Teleological forms of progress are uncontroversially part of the way 
things are, Improvement Progress is not.  What counts as betterment or advancement seems a 
mere projection of our interests at a time - which themselves change.  Indeed, Improvement 
progress is best characterised as change in X which is gainful with respect to some interest I.  
That interest scarcely constitutes X's pre-programmed law-governed end-state, though it does 
reflect some desired goal regarding X for whoever has the interest. 
 
Here teleology and improvement tend to get muddled.  Millenarian and utopian views have 
abounded with expectations of the coming of the Messiah, the realisation of Absolute Spirit, 
the classless post-historical society, the one free fully international trading zone to name a few.  
For some, the process of natural evolution was set to reach its apotheosis in humankind.  No 
doubt, there are latterday visionaries in science, business, politics, and art who posit some 
current in the core of the world which will carry us onward and upward.4 But note, these views 
of progress conflate two quite distinct ideas; namely, that some change is predictably directed 
toward an end, and that some change constitutes a positive advance.  Highly-charged 
millenarian views are in fact Teleological-Improvement hybrids.  They propose an ongoing 
advancement towards or convergence upon a superior pre-ordained end-state. 
 
In summary, the Teleological variant specifies a law-governed goal- or target-relative relation 
whereby things in their relevant changes more closely approximate or converge upon some 
end.  Importantly, this variant is  future-drawn.  There has been Teleological progress in X at 
time t2 only if X at t2 is closer to (achieves better) some reasonably stable, acknowledged, and 
reasonably anticipated goal G  than X at t1 (where t2 is more recent than t1) when gauged 
against a goal common to both times.  This presupposes a constancy of end-state over past and 
future times.  The Improvement variant requires that things in their changes get better over 
time when compared with the past relative to some interest.  Thus the Improvement view is 
backward-looking.  There has been Improvement progress in X at time t2 only if X at t2 is 
better than X at t1 (where t2 is more recent than t1) when gauged against standards of goodness  
 
4On the other side, there have been warnings of ultimate regress - a replacement for stasis as the contrast with 
progress - as changes are all for the worse. 
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(norms) relating to X common to both times.  This presupposes a norm constancy over present 
and past times.  Otherwise there is stasis or regress. 
 
What exactly is the relationship, if any, between the Teleological and Ameliorative 
conceptions of progress? Teleological progress does not entail Improvement progress.  Neither 
does Improvement progress entail Teleological progress.  Why not? Because it may be the case 
that (a) goals and interests are not fixed and in fact change over time so at best one would have 
a kind of truncated convergence (no overarching long-term goals or direction); and (b), more 
seriously, there may in fact be no end-state upon which the changes converge whatever the 
stated interests may happen to be.  For all we know, there may be no final truth about things in 
science or ultimate fairness in law or ultimate control in technology.  All considered, however, 
in order for us to understand properly what is at stake in talking about progress in large practise 
domains such as science or morality, we need somehow to link the Teleological and 
Ameliorative or Improvement views.  This may be possible by drawing yet another distinction 
between internal and external progress, sketched below. 
 
3. Progress Hierarchically Conceived 
 
3.1 The Relativity of Progress 
 
In considering progress in the human sphere we leave behind the relatively stable reality of 
natural ends.  Nature sets its developmental norms which are stamped into the program of life.5 
We have become quite good at exploiting these when we use nature to further our own 
interests.  But human ends are a thing apart and subject to the vagaries of human will and 
desire.  What counts as progress, we are often reminded, is in the eye of the beholder.  There is 
no progress but for the realisation of the interests of those concerned.  Once desired goals and 
variable conceptions of  gainfulness enter the picture, we face, so it seems, the dissolution of 
progress - at least anything that can be counted impersonally by that name.  If human progress 
is thus relative to the interests of those in charge for the time being, talk of progress is simply 
the selective biography of will, and so of no special moment in the real history of the earth. 
 
5 We seem to have abandoned any notion of teleological progress in the overall development of the non-living 
domain. At least, historical geology rests on no such principle even if it may identify regular sequences of large-
scale change. Of note here is that no such discovered geological sequence embodies any norms of change; i.e. a 
predictable sequence is not at the same time a proper sequence. That said, there certainly seem to be normative 
elements built into our identification of a great many abiotic sequences; e.g. many chemical and mechanical 
reactions, and upon these we rest our technology. 
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Examples of the relativity in human progress are common.  Progress in one domain may 
constitute regress in another.  Consider the development of Cyclone B gas by the chemical 
giant I.G. Farben for use in the German death camps.  Technological progress in the 
development and deployment of deadly weapons or the most cost-effective means of disposing 
of minorities, say, may reasonably be seen as regressive with regard to the pursuit of moral or 
political progress.  Moral progress reckoned in terms of the protection of wilderness or the 
emancipation of the enslaved may constitute regress in the economic domain.  (I ignore here 
optimistic claims meant to assure us that all is 'win-win', that we can have our cake and eat it 
too.  In most cases, there is simply no evidence to this effect because we cannot predict the 
future of complex events with any reasonable betting odds.  Anyway, progress domain clashes 
are not like business deals, corporate mergers.  More sensible is the view that we are stuck with 
trade-offs.) Political progress in the form of expanded democratic participation may scuttle 
scientific progress where that depends upon complete independence of inquiry.  Witness the 
growing public uneasiness about the drift of genetic research.  And on it goes.  This all 
happens because of the free-floating conception of improvement and the lack of substance to 
any overarching teleological plan for the direction of human culture. 
 
We are not, however, doomed to this frantic emptiness.  At least, we can order our interests 
hierarchically and identify overarching quasi-teleological end-states which take the form, not 
of definitive and final states of affairs (about which we can only fantasise), but of definitive 
constraints upon our collective pursuits.  In a hierarchical notion of progress, the ends of any 
one level are subject to the constraints placed upon them by the ends of the next-higher level.  
This is especially so if all dimensions of progressive change are themselves meant to converge 
upon what we might call Ultimate Benefit.  Supposing we can talk meaningfully about 
progress in science, government, morality, business, and so forth, it should also be possible to 
talk about progress in all these dimensions converging upon a common end.  At least, such 
would be the plan if we viewed these domains as each occupying a role in the development of 
culture or civilisation or humanity itself.  However foolishly grand this overarching notion may 
sound, the localised and domain-specific alternatives promise very little.  For, outside of any 
such comprehensive framework, we are bound to ceaselessly and screamingly arbitrary 
enterprises. 
 
Claims of forward-looking Teleological progress, when approached as isolated sequences, 
cannot, by themselves, anticipate regressive effects upon other teleological streams.   
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Considerations of backward-looking Improvement progress, by themselves, imply no direction 
toward or convergence upon some independently valuable end-state.  Taken as a cluster and 
conceived as independent practises, progressive streams collectively converge upon nothing in 
particular, nor are we justified in believing  it likely that all independently achieved 
improvements will constitute any sort of aggregate improvement. 
 
To give some body to this notion, a rough analogy can be drawn here with technological 
progress in the development, say, of a machine like the internal combustion engine or the 
personal computer.  The functional components of any machine will themselves undergo 
progressive change.  We can, for instance, consider developments in the parts of engines such 
as carburettors or cooling systems which, though undertaken in relative isolation, collectively 
contribute to progress in the overall engine itself.  But it may not always work out so well.  
Increased efficiency in the cooling system may result in a decrease in the amount of power the 
engine can deliver to the drive train.  An overarching conception of progress in the 
development of the entire machine is required to ensure that progressive improvements in 
lower-level components are compatible with a conception of the machine's teleological 
progress.   
 
3.2 Internal and External Progress 
 
Above, we were beset by the rampant relativity occasioned both by the improvement and 
teleological views of progress which oblige us counter-intuitively to speak in equal terms about 
progress in the development of weapons of mass destruction and progress in the development 
of life-saving medication.  To avoid  this, we either can (a) deny outright that there can be 
progress in such things as mass destruction, or (b) identify at least two distinct levels of 
progress.  Option (a) seems implausible given the cogency of the improvement view.  Our 
nastiest weapons are unquestionably better than their predecessors.  Option (b) seems more 
fruitful, and calls upon a further distinction; namely,  progress internal to a practice and the 
progressiveness of a practice itself  or external progress for short.6 This division will work  
 
6 I am using the term ‘practice’ rather broadly here in the sense not unlike that introduced by Alasdair Macintyre 
in After Virtue (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). Under practices are included not only those specific 
organised rule-bound goal-directed enterprises called ‘techné’ which has loosely been translated as ‘craft’ 
(examples of which include the skills of the doctor, cook, lawyer, navigator, engineer, and, for Plato, politician), 
but also broader superordinate social institutional categories such as law, government, morality, science and 
technology, trade and business, religion, art and the like within which many of the various crafts may be 
identified. 
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best if the improvement view were somehow subordinate to some higher-order teleological or 
convergence view.  So, whereas any practice has its own internal projects and development, 
and the prospect of retrospective improvement with respect to these, it would not follow that 
making progress in that internal respect contributed to progress in another, superordinate, 
respect.  If great technological progress were made in some area of practice (weapons design, 
say) which either contributed directly to ends which were blatantly destructive of life or which 
left in its wake a number of destructive however unintended side-effects, one might be inclined 
to say that such internal progress is progress by courtesy.  Why? Because, there is another test 
which must be met if some change is fully progressive.  Note that this notion describes the 
progressiveness of whole practices (e.g. weapons development, animal husbandry, guitar-
making, advertising, etc., and, more broadly, science, art, government, business) as opposed to 
progress within a practice.   
 
In brief, a practice is fully progressive only if it makes external progress.  This comes down 
to saying that not all practices and the progress they achieve are to be viewed in the same 
terms.  So long as any practice may be judged both internally and externally for progress, there 
must be first- and second-order practices, or subordinate and superordinate practices.  For a 
first-order practice to be fully progressive, it must be progressive with respect to some second-
order practice.  Otherwise, it is merely internally progressive.  One could argue that Morality 
occupies the role of the standing superordinate practice, particularly where some internal 
progress comes into conflict with it.  This makes all the more sense if we can conceive of 
Morality as being convergent upon some common end, or, at least, which subjects all 
subordinate practices to some common convergent constraint.  What, after all, could be the end 
of weapons research? Surely, not to develop weapons which could kill everyone. 
 
It needs saying at the outset that the premium source of such quasi-teleological constraints 
derive from morality.  Why? Because of all the large domains in which we believe progress to 
be possible, morality offers not only an opportunity to measure improvement by retrospection, 
but offers as well reasonably clear quasi-teleological ends in the form of determinate and 
absolute constraints.  Though science and technology at present may retrospectively be better 
than science and technology past, no one can say at all clearly upon what all this improvement 
is meant to converge.7 That is because, without having the whole truth to hand, we have no  
 
7 That said, the belief that science has an ultimate and inevitable point of convergence is a theme running through 
the scientific realism of Charles Sanders Peirce and others. As Peirce puts it: 
 
[A]s each [investigator] perfects his method and his processes, the results will move steadily toward a 
destined center. So with scientific research. Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic 
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way of knowing how much closer we are to it now than we were before.  By comparison with 
our conception of the ultimate future of science, there seems to be a sheer vacuum in the area 
of economic progress which seems totally, anarchically and perhaps inevitably dominated by a 
retrospective view, by considerations of relative improvement over the past gauged limitedly in 
terms of indicators like aggregate output.  Science looks to the final truth about things; 
technology to the ultimate control over natural processes.  Upon what is economic activity 
meant finally to converge? Indefinitely increasing material wealth, all things being equal?  But 
things are never equal in that respect.  Morality occupies a special role in all this because its 
ends are human-driven ideals.  In their 'ideality', they are very much more real to us, more 
palpable and determinable than any conception we might have of what the Whole Truth about 
Nature might be like.  Though there may be a whole truth about nature, there may not; but even 
if there were, we cannot begin to imagine what it might be like.  And so for ultimate control 
over nature, the aim of technology, which, of course, rests on the whole truth.  If there is any 
comprehensive Teleological-Improvement hybrid at all, it is morality. 
 
To see why morality is privileged in this regard, one must have a sense that, ultimately, there 
cannot be any point in our specific enterprises unless there is some over-arching point to all 
our enterprises as such.  Such a conception of the ultimate superordinate focus is characterised 
by  Alasdair Macintyre as the search for "the good life" about which he says: 
views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the 
same conclusion ... The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what 
we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. 
Charles Sanders Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in Philip P. Wiener (ed), Charles S. Peirce: Selected 
Writings (New York: Dover Publications, 1966): 133 (my italics). See also W.F. Sellars, Science, Perception and 
Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963): 96-7. Relatedly, an historically sensitive treatment of science 
as a practice structured to reach, regulate, and sustain community consensus practice is explored by Philip 
Kitcher, The Advancement of Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Further treatments of 
convergence are found in Richard Boyd, "Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of Evidence", Nous 
7 (1973): 1-12; Richard Boyd, "On the Current Status of Scientific Realism", Erkenntnis 19 (1983): 45-90; and 
Hilary Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).  Similar in spirit if 
not in mood is the non-ending effort humans exercise in trying to rise to the next level of objectivity, the one yet 
preparatory for the ever-receding horizon of objectivities before us. See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Convergentism does not lack its critics. Besides the relentless 
assaults from Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1970); Feyerabend, 
Against Method (London: Verso Books, 1988); and defenders of "the strong programme"(e.g. , Barry Barnes, 
David Bloor & John Henry, Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis (London: Athlone Press, 1996); see  
Larry Laudan, "A Confutation of Convergent Realism", Philosophy of Science 48 (1981): 19-48. 
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....the good life for man is the life spent seeking for the good life for man, and the 
virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what 
more and what else the good life for man is...8 
 
Of course, one needs not only those virtues which enable us to understand what the good life 
is, but also a social and political system in which those with such virtues may exercise them 
fully in such a way as to be most likely to reach an answer.  The mere having of such virtues is 
not enough.  One must also have the opportunity to exercise them, and that depends upon the 
kind of community in which one lives.  Analogously, moral progress - the movement toward 
moral improvement and morally worthy ends - is possible only in a social and political setting 
which provides an environment in which the pursuit and realisation of such morally worthy 
ends is conceivable.  Couple this with the constraints imposed both by our tradition of 
liberation and our beginning to uncover the real roots of our nature, and we invariably find 
ourselves increasingly less prone to accept the internal successes of subordinate practices on 
their own terms. 
 
4. Taking Stock 
 
We have, so far, covered a fair amount of ground, and an interim summary is in order.  
Regarding human activities, most of what is called progress turns out unsurprisingly to be 
relative to specific practices.  Progress in a practice conceived in isolation can be viewed either 
teleologically as movement towards an identifiable known end-point which constitutes the 
ultimate goal of the practice,  or in an ameliorative sense where, without any clear conception 
of where the sequence is meant finally to go, we judge our present state to be an improvement 
over the past.  So we count progress in terms such as these: we are now less prone to die from 
childhood disease than we once were; we now can produce more food per hectare than we once 
could; we now understand more about the history and  mechanism of life than we once did; we 
now enjoy a greater per capita income than we once did; and so on.  In each case we can talk 
sensibly about amelioration in the practice, and yet we cannot talk comfortably about 
amelioration generally.  For our progress has been completely indiscriminate.  How so? 
Because of the following: we are now better able to kill and maim than we were in the past, 
better able to reduce the number of species than ever before, better able to increase the human 
population than ever before, and so on.   
 
8Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame University Press, 1981). 
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All of these represent some kind of advancement over past practice, and, relative to one view 
or another, all constitute progress.  But we reach a peculiarly awkward state.  If we merely 
relativise progress to given desires and local achievements, and if we accept the enormous 
variety of desires afoot, we are forced to accept that progress in one area constitutes regress in 
another, and thus forced to think of progress as merely relative to local interests.  If it is merely 
relative to local interests, there is no neutral sense we can attach to the notion at all.  Now, we 
may wish to deny any such neutral sense altogether.  If so, we are perfectly free to carry on 
accepting that progress as such is (merely) a name attached to certain local interests and 
desires.  The value in this, if nothing else, would be a variety of intellectual honesty in which 
we decide simply to stop talking glamorised nonsense about our movement onward and 
upward.  Whose movement onward, after all? What direction upward, after all? 
 
But we are not doomed to accept that any notion of progress must founder upon such relativity 
so long as it seems sensible to claim that some progress is just bad or over-rated, and that some 
progress is on the right track.  Suppose we appeal generally and neutrally to a ‘right track’.  
Surely this is exactly what we are doing when we question, say, the green revolution’s legacy 
of soil contaminants, or the tendency of growing multinational domination of world trade to 
emasculate government for and by the people.  Suppose such an appeal makes sense - and it 
must make at least as much sense as any conception we might have of a bad law for, contrary 
to the fantasies of legislators, the law is not always the Law.  Then we have somehow to stand 
outside the local domains of  teleological and ameliorative progress and ask how these fit 
together and collectively contribute toward some higher-order end.  At that point, we 
acknowledge the need to distinguish between internal or localised progress, and external or 
superordinate progress.  From that external standpoint, we require something at least quasi-
teleological; i.e. we need a sense that all our varied practices must converge upon some 
superordinate focus. 
 
What that focus is is no easy task to state clearly, but we are not entirely at a loss.  We have, as 
outlined at the start, a long-standing and continuing tradition of philosophical inquiry into the 
foundations of human value.  That has given rise to a culture which has begun to accept and 
internalise the fundamental values of autonomy and sovereignty.  These give us, if nothing 
else, a very grand set of external constraints upon our subordinate practices.      And these 
constraints have palpably affected the very development, structure, and reform of government.   
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Sadly, as government slowly accepts its limitations, we are beset by the regressive growth of 
so-called managerial or corporate culture which too will eventually find its proper place once 
response to the constraints it tends to ignore have been made.  Change in our scientific 
understanding of nature has brought us - perhaps inadvertently - ever more into the very 
picture of the world we find ourselves forced to draw.  From the simple and direct Baconian 
imperative to better the human estate, science moves slowly, perhaps begrudgingly, to hear a 
richer imperative - to understand just where we fit in the bigger picture and just who we 
collectively are.  And as our own story begins to blend within the bigger picture, we are 
increasingly constrained in our conception of our overall worth.  Consider, in that respect, the 
implications for our regarding ourselves simply as inhabitants, temporally limited, come here 
by chance.  Both these outlooks are unmitigatedly moral since both reflect very generally upon 
what, for the sake of the beings involved, we may and may nor rightly do.   
 
Our occasional and (thankfully) unkillable flair for intellectual consistency does the rest.  Such, 
at least, I read without, I hope, excessive optimism in the many diversity respecting 
initiatives of concern at present - about species, minorities, ethnic groups, languages, 
ecosystems, national sovereignty and more - which take fragmentation and difference as 
ultimate.  And which take the preservation of fragmentation and difference as the prime 
constraining imperative as flowing from what we have learned over the last several centuries. 
 
4.1 Where All This is Tending 
 
I began with the antics of Jake and Elwood to provide a simple indication of what moral 
progress, as external to our local limited enterprises, looks like on the ground.  I take it to be a 
sign of moral progress not only because of its ameliorative tone, but also because it points to a 
teleological drift.  Why don’t we buy and sell each other? Is it good for business? At one point 
it was a disaster for business, but we learned to accommodate that.  Is it good for science and 
technology? Absolutely not, for it stifles our efforts to understand fully and to control.  
Somehow, miraculously perhaps, something besides local limited progress prevailed. 
 
Is this the end of that story? I think not, if I can permit myself the treat of cautious projection.  
The Jake-Elwood joke is possible only because of a gradual hard-fought move towards 
increasing inclusive moral  expansionism.  The story of the ‘expanding circle’ has been our  
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history overall, and such, looking at certain developments, seems an entrenched theme.  It 
takes two primary forms; namely (a) growing moral Inclusiveness, and (b) growing moral 
Pluralism. 
The former reflects the growth of subject-specific moral developments  which has cast its net 
over women, children, foreigners, humans, other animals, life, the ecosphere, and is aimed to 
capture common due and proper moral regard, to ensure inclusion in the class of morally 
considerable beings and, ultimately, to achieve moral equality.  The latter reflects  the growth 
of subject-specific moral developments designed to locate and emphasize the moral relevance 
of difference and the regard needing to be shown to it.  Push these where they lead and the 
limits to our internal progress become ever greater. 
 
But, surely, one will be overwhelmed by doubt, by pessimism about moral progress.  How can 
we square any belief in moral progress with the barbaric facts of the century, the many purges, 
acts of genocide, brutal governments, and other forms of oppression? What indeed of the mass 
decimation of  habitat, the wholesale extermination of other species in the name of economic 
gain? Where in all this does one situate the seeming trend toward greater moral inclusiveness? 
 
On this, just two parting reflections.  It is a sign of general moral expansionist sentiments that 
an increasingly larger proportion of people are at least now aware that certain actions taken 
actually have a moral quality, that they are not merely to be rued and abided fatalistically, that 
there is a moral reckoning which must be taken into account.  There are even signs of 
institutional acknowledgment; at least, such is one take on the Nuremberg Trials, the various 
War Crimes Tribunals, Environmental Reviews, the International Whaling Commission, and 
more.  Law, which lays out our most commonly acknowledged form of constraint, has been 
changed by straightforward moral demands for change.  The second remark derives from some 
made earlier on about time and belief.  Over the long run, we now present will indeed all be 
dead.  But such is the pace of real and significant change in human history and understanding 
that we can, perhaps at best, be aware, given the story lived by our own dead predecessors, that 
the story has indeed changed, and changed intelligibly.  Where we have perhaps progressed 
most is in appreciating the presence of a larger scale dimension of progressive change in 
human civilisation which has let us sense the force of something daunting yet oddly agreeable 
in its development.  And with that the reflection that there is something altogether provincial 
and even immature in attaching any interest in the fact that, yes, over the long run, we now 
present will indeed all be dead.  Thank heavens for that, one should say.  Think otherwise of 
the places others next in line would never have seen. 
